lives, turning Palestine into a binational dualistic entity, administratively united by the mandate. Palestine's dualism was reflected in two distinct economies. One was the low-income, primarily rural, and relatively backward Arab economy, and the other was the relatively modern, high-income, and urban Jewish economy.
We tell here the story of these two economies down to 1935, relying heavily on newly estimated aggregate and industrial production series for the Arab sector.2 These are the product of our nearly completed quantitative research project on the economy of Mandatory Palestine, of which this paper is an interim report. The analysis has three sectors: the Arab sector, the Jewish sector, and the Mandatory Government. The first two are treated as national economies whose products measure economic activity. Intersectoral transactions and transfers between any two of the three sectors are treated as international trade. Table I presents Judging by these structural features as well as by the facts that Arab agriculture was dominated by traditional, extensive farming compared to Jewish modern agricultural production, and that Arab manufacturing and crafts consisted primarily of home and cottage industries, Mandatory Palestine can certainly be categorized as a developing dual economy. One should stop short, however, of viewing the Arab sector as a nonmarket, subsistence sector of the standard dual economy models. The importance of the market in Arab economic activity is evident from the large share of marketed output in agricultural production (Table 7) and by the significant weight of transport and trade in total product and employment (Table 1) .
I. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE ARAB AND JEWISH SECTORS
Consider likewise the resources and uses accounts, presented in Table 2 Apart from these characteristics, reflected in the growth rate differences, one finds a surprising degree of similarity between the two economies. This is particularly true for the "external market dependency" of production. The Arab share of foreign (as distinct from intersectoral) export was not much smaller than that of the Jewish economy-11.4 versus 13.9 percent of net national product. In both economies export was dominated by citrus-81 and 86 percent, respectively, of the total f.o.b. value for the Arab and the Jewish economies in 1935. Moreover, the combined shares of intersectoral sales and exports excluding labor services were virtually identical-22 percent in the Arab economy and 21.7 percent in the Jewish economy. Figure 1 shows the levels of population, net national product, and product per capita (in constant 1936 prices) for the entire interwar period; annual averages, their growth rates, and Arab-Jewish ratios, are presented in Table 3 Table 3 and sources cited there. associated with a steady, high annual population growth rate of 2.5 percent. Impressive as this record was, it was surpassed by the extraordinary performance of the Jewish settlers' community whose population, total product, and product per capita grew at average annual rates of 11. The Arab economy did not enjoy similar inflows of real resources and its growth thus depended much less than did the Jewish economy on the increase in conventionally measured input services. This is demonstrated in Table 4 , where a simple sources-of-growth analysis for the two national economies is attempted.
II. COMPARATIVE GROWTH
In 1.7 km/km2 in 1921 to 4.9 km/km2 in 1938 and the port of Haifa, which began operating in 1931.5 The more surprising finding is the Arab lead of about 20 to 30 percentage points in the relative contribution of total factor productivity to product growth. This differential holds for all the alternative assumptions regarding the distribution of factor shares.
As for interpretation, it is well known that simple growth accounting procedures of the kind performed here is an imprecise and at best very crude measure of input growth and productivity advance. This is particularly true in our case, where in addition to the standard problems of specification, measurements, and input quality, one can cite some Palestine-specific nonproductivity, residual-increasing factors. Prominent among them were governmental infrastructure investments and outlays on health, education, research, and extension services. These are excluded in our accounting system from both sectors' capital formation and product, and their contribution to growth is thus hidden in the residual. Note that government outlays (net of transfers) constituted no less than 12.3 percent of Arab net product and 10.1 percent of Jewish net product in 1935 (see Table 2 ).
An increase in the ratio of cultivated to cultivable land operated in the same direction. This is particularly relevant to the Arab economy, for which the existing evidence suggests that the expansion of agricultural markets led to a rise in the utilization of the existing cultivable land from about 5 million dunams cultivated in the early 1920s to more than 7 million dunams in the mid-1930s.6 The increase in land utilization in the Jewish economy, on the other hand, was closely related to the purchase of Arab land (which by itself increased Arab measured productivity) and was thus taken into account in the growth accounting.
These qualifications notwithstanding, the difference between its contribution to growth in the two national economies seems to be large enough to warrant the conjecture that productivity advance was more important in the Arab economy than in the Jewish one.
This outcome may be related in part to the different patterns of change in the industrial composition of production between the two economies. The growth of the Jewish sector was relatively balanced in terms of the industrial distribution of both product and employment; the growth of the Arab sector was unbalanced (see the distributions and coefficients of variation in Table 1 ). The unbalanced growth, while not revolutionizing the Arab economy, certainly promoted productivity. This can be inferred from Table 5 , in which the percentage rise of nondwelling product per employed person between 1922 and 1935 is decomposed into within-industry advance in product per worker and between-industry labor reallocation. As shown, the reallocation factor accounted for 12 percent of the growth rate of Arab total product per laborer: in view of the labor earnings differentials between agriculture and nonagricultural pursuits (to be discussed below) we suggest that this reflected an increase in total factor productivity as well. Labor reallocation could thus account for 15-20 percent of the "residual." Considering the probably nontrivial weight of nonproductivity elements in the residual it can be inferred that labor reallocation played a substantial role in making for total factor productivity growth in the Arab sector. Percent net-of-land sales in total national product 9.3 14.0 7.8 Percent (including land) sales in total national 13.9 24.5 product The Arab economy probably also gained from external benefits generated by technological spillover and demonstration effects from the modem Jewish economy, and from governmental measures aimed directly at raising Arab productivitity. Although the paucity of the available data do not allow any quantitative assessment of these effects, there are enough qualitative accounts in various governmental reports and independent studies to indicate their significance especially in agriculture, where they induced improvements in production methods and crop mix. The organization of production was rationalized by the reduction of communal land periodically reapportioned among the peasants in the form of scattered strips, and the rise in private land holdings. 10 Table 7 shows that the most prominent development in both the Jewish and Arab sectors was the increasing share of citrus-Palestine's major export cash crop-in total and marketed output. Note in addition the rising proportion of the highly commercialized noncitrus crops (such as intensively cultivated field crops and fruit) in Arab agricultural output and the increase in the market share of most agricultural products between 1921 and 1935. These developments were closely related to the large and rising share of Jewish purchases of noncitrus Arab agricultural produce, from 18 percent of marketed output in 1921 to 24.1 percent in 1935.
Significant as the advance in agriculture may have been, it should be recalled that it was a relatively low labor productivity industry and the declining share of agricultural employment was (as shown in Table 5 ) the source of Arab "between-industry" productivity gain. Moreover, the evidence suggests that, contrary to the situation in the Jewish economy, the skill-adjusted nonagricultural market wage rate in the Arab sector was higher than average labor productivity in Arab agricultural in both 1921 and 1935-although the difference seems to have declined over time. It means that the value of the marginal productivity of labor was lower in agriculture than elsewhere, which suggests that there was at least some surplus labor in Arab agriculture, resulting-as the usual dual economy model would predict-from an average (instead of a marginal) product criterion for (mostly self-employed) labor allocation within traditional agriculture. All this implies that fast as the Arab economy was growing in interwar Palestine its actual growth rate may have fallen short of its potential one, had a larger part of its labor force left agriculture sooner and faster than it actually did.
V. POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
Was growth affected by the national-political conflict between Arabs and Jews? This question is particularly relevant in view of the efforts made to limit intersectoral relations. On the Arab side the efforts focused on dissuading landlords from selling property to Jews. On the Jewish side separatist efforts were directed toward economic segregation along national lines; although they included the government fiscal system and the product markets, they were mainly aimed at segregating the unskilled labor market. The available evidence suggests, however, that the attempts had only mild effects, at least until the Arab revolt of 1936. "
The issue is whether, in a plausible counterfactual alternative to the Arab-Jewish conflict, the nature of intersectoral relations would have been significantly different. The answer appears to be no. Neither the basic Zionist economic goals-including the insistence on Jewish labor-nor the extent of Jewish immigration would have been much different from the actual ones had Arab-Jewish tensions been lower. The growth of the Jewish community-up to the mid-1930s-and the basic Zionist socioeconomic goals were largely independent of the Arab-Jewish conflict. This is not to say that deviations from the actual observed patterns could not have taken place. For example, the rates of Jewish immigration, capital import, and economic growth might have been larger, while Arab growth might have deviated from the actual path in either direction. But this would probably not have altered the basic characteristics of intersectoral relations. These were determined by the "dual economy" and by the Palestine-specific attributes. It is these features (quite independent of the Arab-Jewish political rivalry) which made the two economies grow jointly and severally at one and the same time.
